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I. INTRODUCTION
Year after year, our society's demand for energy continues to grow. In
order to keep up with this growing demand, it has become critical for the
United States to develop low-cost, reliable energy resources. As part of this
effort, the energy industry is experiencing a renewed focus on effectively
locating and utilizing natural gas, a viable source of fuel that has been produced
and consumed in the Appalachian region for many years. Natural gas is an
attractive alternative to other sources of fuel; in addition to being plentiful both
in West Virginia and in other portions of the United States, it is one of the
cleanest, safest, and most versatile sources of energy available.' The discovery
of what has been thought to be "the second largest natural gas field in the
world" 2-the Marcellus Shale-literally right under our feet has placed West
Virginia at the epicenter for advancements in natural gas exploration and
production. Indeed, the term "Marcellus Shale" has become a buzzword among
local and national industry professionals and laymen alike.
Recently, natural gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale became an
economically viable practice. Technological developments related to the
technique known as "horizontal drilling" now allow gas producers access to gas
that was previously believed to be too difficult to reach within the rock shale.
The advent of horizontal drilling in West Virginia raises several novel legal
questions related to the rights of the various parties involved in the drilling
process.
This Note addresses two distinct but related questions associated with
horizontal drilling in West Virginia. Part II provides a background on the
history of natural gas production in West Virginia and the beginnings of
horizontal drilling in the state. Part III examines whether mineral leases that
predate the common practice of horizontal drilling actually permit leaseholders
to use the technique. Currently, West Virginia law does not provide a blackand-white answer as to whether the practice is technically permitted by leases
that came into effect long before horizontal drilling became a common practice
in the drilling industry. In the context of this question, all drilling is assumed to
take place within the same subsurface mineral tract. Part IV focuses on legal
questions that arise when the bore of the horizontal well crosses from one
underground mineral tract into a separate mineral tract. This section explores
the rights of both the surface owner and the mineral owner and examines
whether the surface owner should have the ability to prevent gas producers
from using their land to drill for gas located on neighboring mineral tracts.

I Background,NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/background.asp (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012).
2

MARCELLUS SHALE COALITION, 10 FAST FACTS ABOUT THE MARCELLUS SHALE,

available

at http://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/MSCFastFactsLarge.pdf
visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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After analyzing the current state of West Virginia case law and the law
in other jurisdictions, this Note argues that it is unclear how the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia ("Court") will rule on the question of whether
horizontal wells drilled within the same mineral tract should be permitted by
leases that predate the common practice of horizontal drilling. Nevertheless,
this Note argues that the Court should hold that horizontal drilling should be
permitted under these circumstances. Additionally, this Note argues that
horizontal wells which pass from one mineral tract into another mineral tract
may be prohibited by the owner of the surface on which the well is being
drilled because this constitutes an unreasonable extension of the rights granted
by the lease.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides a brief history of the development of natural gas
production in West Virginia. This Part also discusses some of the
characteristics of the Marcellus Shale and explains the process of horizontal
drilling.
A.

History ofNatural Gas Production in West Virginia

Before discussing some of the legal issues surrounding horizontal
drilling in West Virginia, it is important to understand how important the
natural gas industry has become to the state. Both natural gas and oil
production in West Virginia have their beginnings with the salt mining
industry.3 According to the West Virginia Geological and Economic survey, the
first natural gas was struck in Charleston in 1815 in a well intended to mine for
salt.4 At that time, oil and gas were considered to be of little value, and salt
miners discarded the fuels as waste byproducts.5 By 1826, industries had
discovered some of the potential uses for oil and gas resources, and the
Kanawha Valley region "became a pioneer in the discovery of petroleum by
boring and in the use of oil and gas on a commercial scale."
West Virginia was the nation's leader in natural gas production from
1906 to 1917.' Production levels declined between 1917 and 1934 but

Taylor Kuykendall, The History of Natural Gas in West Virginia, REGISTER-HERALD.COM,

Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.register-herald.com/marcellus/xl709528990/The-history-of-naturalgas-in-West-Virginia.
4

History of WV Mineral Industries-Oil and Gas, W. VA. GEOLOGICAL & ECON. SURV.,

http://www.wvgs.wvnet.edu/www/geology/geoldvog.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
Id.
6

Id.

7

Kuykendall, supra note 3.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 18

[Vol. 115

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

494

increased again from that point until 1970.8 Today, forty-nine out of fifty-five
of West Virginia's counties produce natural gas in some amount through
approximately 40,500 wells across the state. 9 As of 2009, the Energy
Information Administration reported West Virginia as the 14th highest
producing state for natural gas, with annual production totaling more than 264
billion cubic feet.'( Much of this production expansion, at least within the past
decade, can be attributed to the increased development of the Marcellus Shale.
Development of the Marcellus Shale

B.

Geologists have long been aware of the existence of the Marcellus
Shale-a black shale geological formation that "starts at the base of the
Catskills in upstate New York, stretches across the upstate toward Marcellus,
New York (the town from which the formation is named) and southwest to
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio."" Although the formation was recognized
as being potentially rich in fossil fuels,12 it was not until recently that
advancements in drilling and gas production technology allowed energy
producers to tap into the vast reservoir of natural gas trapped within the rock
formation.
The current Marcellus Shale gas "play"l 3 appears to have begun in
2003, when Range Resources drilled a natural gas well in Washington County,
Pennsylvania.14 Range had not intended to tap the Marcellus Shale at that time;
however, the rock formation showed potential and the company completed a
Marcellus well in 2004.'1 Range first began production from the well in 2005,
and it soon drilled additional wells and began experimenting with horizontal

8

Id.

9
About
West
Virginia Energy,
ENERGY
CITIZENS
(Mar.
15,
2012),
http://energycitizens.org/ec/advocacy/details.aspxPostld=1516.
to Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ngprod-sum-a_EPGOFGW-mmcfa.htm (last updated Aug. 31,
2012).
11

What

is

Marcellus

Shale?,

SHALE

TRAINING

&

EDUC.

CENTER,

http://www.msetc.org/whatis.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
12

Id

1
A "play" has been defined as "[a] set of known or postulated oil and gas accumulations
sharing similar geologic, geographic, and temporal properties, such as source rock, migration
pathway, timing, trapping mechanism, and hydrocarbon type." Glossary: P, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfn?id=p (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
14 Hobart King, Marcellus Shale - Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM,
http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited Sept 18, 2012).
15

CHRIS PERRY & LARRY WICKSTROM, OHIO GEOLOGICAL SURVEY - THE MARCELLUS SHALE
PLAY: GEOLOGY, HISTORY, AND OIL & GAS POTENTIAL IN OHIO (2010), available at

http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/10/Energy/Marcellus/TheMarcellusShalePlay
-and Perry.pdf.
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drilling and hydraulic fracturing methods that had been developed for use in the
Barnett Shale in Texas.16 By the end of 2007, "more than 375 gas wells with
suspected Marcellus intent had been permitted in Pennsylvania" alone.' 7
Following the initial discovery, interest in the Marcellus skyrocketed, and
natural gas producers across the country began to acquire land and business
interests in the region and to drill vertical and horizontal wells in order to
evaluate the gas potential of the Marcellus.' 8
While the actual amount of natural gas stored in the Marcellus has been
heavily debated by scientists and geologists over the past few years, 19 even
conservative estimates hold that the Marcellus Shale reserves are massive. In
2010, National Geographic compared current reserve estimates to those of
some of the largest proven fields in the world:
Estimates are that the Marcellus [S]hale holds between [fifty]
trillion cubic feet (TCF) and 500 TCF of natural gas. At the
low end, that's double the gas stores seen in Alaska's big
Prudhoe Bay at the dawn of its development. At the high end,
the reserves would be second to those of the world's largest
natural gas field, the Pars field of Iran and Qatar.20
For comparison, fifty TCF "would be enough to supply the entire United States
for about two years and have a wellhead value of about one trillion dollars." 2 1
The close proximity of the Marcellus to the energy-demanding population
centers of the Northeastern United States makes the formation even more
economically attractive when the costs associated with gas transportation are
taken into account.22

King, supra note 14. The Barnett Shale, located primarily in northern Texas, is considered
to be one of, if not the largest shale natural gas reserves in the United States. FactsAbout Barnett
Shale, BARNErr SHALE ENERGY EDUC. COUNCIL, http://www.bseec.org/stories/BarnettShale (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012). The shale was first drilled in 1981, but it was not until the early 2000s
that newly developed horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing methods made drilling in the
shale an economically viable practice. Id.
17 King, supra note 14.
1s
Fossil
Energy:
Marcellus
Shale,
W.
VA.
DPT.
COM.,
http://wvcommerce.org/energy/fossil-energy/marcellusshale.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
19
Press Release, Marcellus Shale Coalition, Myth vs. Fact: USGS/EIA Marcellus Data (Aug.
30, 2011), available at http://marcelluscoalition.org/2011/08/myth-vs-fact-usgseia-marcellusdata.
20
Marianne Lavelle, Natural Gas Stirs Hope and Fear in Pennsylvania,NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/10/101022-energy-marcellusshale-gas-overview/.
21 King, supra note 14.
22
What is Marcellus Shale?, supra note 11.
16
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Marcellus production occurs primarily in five states: Pennsylvania,
New York, Maryland, Ohio, and West Virginia.2 3 While the majority of gas
production expansion thus far has taken place in Pennsylvania, West Virginia
has also seen a significant increase in production. In August 2011, reports
showed that "natural gas production in West Virginia and Pennsylvania now
averages almost four billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), more than five times as
much as the average from 2004 through 2008."24 These two states are now
responsible for more than eighty-five percent of all natural gas production in
the Northeast. 25 Furthermore, production in West Virginia "has grown over
[forty percent] since January 2010 and recently surpassed [one] Bcf/d." 26 It
appears that the Marcellus Shale will play an integral role in the West Virginia
energy industry for years to come. This production boom would not have been
possible without the help of a novel drilling technique-horizontal drilling.
The Rise ofHorizontalDrilling

C.

Two technologies have made gas production possible in the onceunusable Marcellus region-horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. These
techniques, which saw their first significant action in natural gas production in
Texas's Barnett Shale, are relatively new to the Appalachian Basin.2 7 While the
first true horizontal oil well was completed in Texas in 1929, there was little
use for the technique until the 1980s, when the invention of downhole
telemetry equipment and improved drilling motors turned what was once a farfetched idea into an economically viable practice.28 Horizontal drilling has been
described as
the process of drilling a well from the surface to a subsurface
location just above the target oil or gas reservoir called the
"kickoff point", then deviating the well bore from the vertical
plane around a curve to intersect the reservoir at the "entry
point" with a near-horizontal inclination, and remaining within
the reservoir until the desired bottom hole location is reached. 2 9
The partner technique, hydraulic fracturing (also known as "hydrofracking," or
simply "fracking"), involves pumping high volumes of water and chemical
23

MARCELLUS SHALE COALITION,

24

Pennsylvania Drives Northeast Natural Gas Production Growth, U.S.

supra note 2.
ENERGY

INFO.

ADMIN. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=2870.
25
26

Id.
Id.

27

King, supra note 14.
28
Lynn Helms, Horizontal Drilling, 35 DMR NEWSLETTER, no. 1, 2008 at 2, available at
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/ndgs/newsletter/NL0308/pdfs/Horizontal.pdf.
29
Idatl1.
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additives into the well at extremely high pressures in order to fracture the rock
formation and release the trapped gas. 30 Hydraulic fracturing raises its own host
of legal and environmental concerns, and the process will not be addressed in
this Note other than to point out the substantial role it plays in retrieving gas
from the Marcellus Shale.'
Horizontal gas wells offer several advantages over traditional vertical
wells. Horizontal wells create maximum surface area contact between the gasbearing rock formation and the well itself. The "pay zone" of the well-the
area where the gas can flow into the well from the shale-is significantly
increased if the well is drilled linearly with the length of the shale.32 When
coupled with hydraulic fracturing, this allows for an exponential increase in
reservoir contact.3 3 These wells are most efficient when drilled in a direction
that intersects the maximum number of fractures in the well.34 A single
horizontal well, when located in a permeable reservoir such as the Marcellus
Shale, can gather significantly more underground gas than a single vertical well
in the same location.35 These higher production rates can equate to a higher
return on investment for horizontal well projects than for vertical well projects
when used in the proper manner.36
Drilling horizontally allows producers to reach target gas locations that
could not be reached using traditional vertical drilling. A large pocket of gas
situated under a residential neighborhood may have been inaccessible via
vertical drilling; however, horizontal drilling might allow the producer to reach
this gas by drilling the well at another location and directing the well bore to
reach the target gas pocket.3 7
Additionally, numerous horizontal wells can be drilled using the same
well pad on the surface.3 8 This practice can significantly reduce surface
disturbance because several horizontal wells in the same location can produce

King, supra note 14.
For more information, see J. DANIEL ARTHUR, BRIAN BoHM, & MARK LAYNE, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATURAL GAS WELLS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE (2008),
Tom
available at http://www.thefriendsvillegroup.com/HydraulicFracturingReportl.2008.pdf;
Gjelten, Water Contamination Concerns Linger For Shale Gas, NPR.ORG (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=113142234; Tom Zeller, Jr., E.PA. Considers Risks of Gas Extraction,N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 2010, at Bl.
32
Hobart King, Directional and Horizontal Drilling in Oil and Gas Wells, GEOLOGY.COM,
http://geology.com/articles/horizontal-drilling (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
3
Belgacem Chariag, Schlumberger, Maximize Reservoir Contact, E&P MAG. (Jan. 16,
2007), http://www.epmag.com/EP-Magazine/archive/Maximize-reservoir-contact179.
34
King, supra note 32.
3s
See Helms, supra note 28, at 1.
30

31

36

Id.

3
38

See King, supra note 32.
Id.
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as much or more gas than numerous vertical wells scattered across a wider
area. 39 For instance, in 2010 the University of Texas at Arlington was
recognized for drilling twenty-two natural gas wells on only twenty-one and a
half acres of land.4 0 The well site produces sixty-two million cubic feet of gas
per day, or enough to "meet the needs of 877 homes for an entire year." 4' This
practice is especially useful in urban areas where permits for multiple wells
become increasingly expensive and difficult to acquire.
Horizontal drilling does have its downsides, however, not the least of
which being the substantial cost involved. A recent study published by the
University of Pittsburgh set out to examine the direct effects of a single
Marcellus Shale well drilled in Southwestern Pennsylvania using horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing.

The study found that the total cost for such a

well comes to approximately $7.6 million.43 The study broke down the costs of
bringing a well from conception to completion:
*

Land acquisition and leasing: $2,100,000

*

Permitting: $10,000

*

Vertical drilling: $663,000

*

Horizontal drilling: $1,200,000

*

Hydraulic fracturing: $2,500,000

*

Completion: $200,000

*

Production to gathering: $472,00044

In short, when combined with hydraulic fracturing, a horizontal well "can cost
45
up to three times as much per foot as drilling a vertical well."

39
Why Multiple Horizontal Wells from Centralized Well Pads Should Be Usedfor the Marcellus
Shale,
W.
VA.
SURFACE
OWNERS'
RIGHTS
ORG.,
http://www.wvsoro.org/resources/marcellus/horizdrilling.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
40
BarnettShale, UT-Arlington Pad Site Exemplifies New Drilling Trend, AGELIO NETWORKS
(Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.agelio.net/ut-arlington-pad-site-exemplifies-new-drilling-trend.
41

42

Id
WILLIAM E. HEFLEY ET AL., THE EcoNoMIC IMPACT OF THE VALUE CHAIN OF A MARCELLUS

at
available
2011),
(Aug.
4
WELL
SHALE
http://www.business.pitt.edu/faculty/papers/PittMarcellusShaleEconomics20l I.pdf.
43
How Much Does It Cost to Drill a Single Marcellus Well? $7.6M, MARCELLUS DRILLING
NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011), http://marcellusdrilling.com/2011/09/how-much-does-it-cost-to-drill-asingle-marcellus-well-7-6m/.
4

Id.

45

King, supra note 32.
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In addition to the higher financial expenses incurred by drilling
companies, horizontal drilling is also accompanied by a host of other costs.
Horizontal wells in the Marcellus Shale can take several months to drill, while
traditional vertical wells can be completed in a mere seven to ten days.4 6
Horizontal wells also require anywhere from seven to fifteen acres of land,
compared to three to five acres with a vertical well.4 7 The time needed for
hydraulic fracture is significantly increased with a horizontal well, and the
fracturing process for horizontal wells can consume nearly ten times the
amount of water.4 8 The drilling rigs used to drill horizontal wells are
considerably larger than those used to drill vertical wells. 49 Finally, the number
of trips required by work trucks can rise from approximately 200 for a vertical
well to approximately 1600 for a horizontal well due to increased shipments of
men and materials to and from the drill site.50 The additional burdens stemming
from horizontal drilling are central to the legal issues discussed later in this
Note.
Legal Issues SurroundingHorizontalDrillingand the Use of Mineral
Leases

D.

Many years ago, land owners in West Virginia began to separate
surface and mineral rights-namely coal, oil, and gas rights-using various
severance instruments, including severance deeds and wills. These instruments
permitted a land owner to convey the surface of the land to another party and
reserve a right to the minerals for himself, or vice versa. In order for the
mineral right ownership to have any value, the mineral owner must have access
to the surface above the minerals in order to reach his property. Thus, the Court
has held that mineral owners have "the right to enter upon and use the
superjacent surface by such manner and means as is fairly reasonable and
necessary to reach and remove the minerals."
Mineral owners typically do not have the ability or the resources
needed to develop the minerals to which they hold title. Instead, these owners
either find or are sought out by mineral developers who seek permission to
develop the minerals themselves. 52 This is where mineral leases come in. Under
a mineral lease, the leasee obtains "100% of, or the exclusive right to develop,
46

Marcellus Shale Drilling: Vertical vs. Horizontal, KNAPP

ACQUISITIONS & PRODUCTION

LLC, http://www.knappap.com/content/vwells.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
47

Id

48

Id

49

Id

so

Id

5'

Phillips v. Fox, 458 S.E.2d 327, 332 (W. Va. 1995).

52

J.

THOMAS

LANE,

OIL

AND

GAS

10

(2000),

available

at

http://www.wvyounglawyers.com/handbook/chapter26.pdf.
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produce and market, the minerals."5 The leasee is responsible for bearing all of
the costs associated with mineral production, including permit acquisition,
exploratory studies, and well drilling and maintenance. 54 In return, the leasee is
entitled to the profits earned from the minerals, minus a royalty paymentcustomarily one-eighth of the proceeds or the market value-that is made to the
lessor.ss
This system operates fairly well when vertical wells are used by
mineral producers. However, the introduction of horizontal wells presents
several new questions to which our legal precedent provides no clear answer.
Should old mineral leases, executed long before horizontal drilling was
commonly used as a method for natural gas extraction, permit a gas producer to
drill horizontal wells even though the original owners who conveyed the right
to drill never imagined the technique? Furthermore, should a gas producer be
permitted to use the surface of one tract to drill a horizontal well that begins
above one mineral tract and ends in a different mineral tract?
Part III examines whether mineral leases that predate the common use
of horizontal drilling actually permit horizontal drilling to be used at all. To
answer this question, we will assume that the horizontal well will remain within
the boundaries of one mineral tract under the surface on which the well is
drilled. Currently, West Virginia law does not provide a black-and-white
answer to this question.
Part IV explores whether the mineral owner has the right to use the
surface above his minerals in order to drill a horizontal well that crosses from
the subjacent land into another mineral tract. Recent litigation in West Virginia
has raised this issue several times, and the Court has yet to provide interested
parties with a clear answer.
III. Do MINERAL LEASES THAT PREDATE THE COMMON USE OF HORIZONTAL
DRILLING ACTUALLY PERMIT HORIZONTAL DRILLING?

Throughout West Virginia's history, the Court has attempted to balance
the rights of surface owners entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their land
with the rights of mineral owners entitled to access and to produce their
minerals underneath the surface. If a gas producer wishes to drill a horizontal
well, one way to do so legally would be to simply obtain a lease from the
mineral owner that explicitly grants the right to drill horizontally. However, a
question arises if the gas producer decides to drill a horizontal well using rights
granted in a mineral lease executed before the invention of horizontal drilling.
This scenario might occur when a gas producer, who has historically drilled
conventional vertical wells on a given site, wishes to take advantage of the
s3

Id at 11.

54

Id

55

Id
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relatively recent advancements in horizontal drilling technology and the
associated economic benefits.
This portion of the Note examines case law from both West Virginia
and other jurisdictions. Part A explores four significant cases from West
Virginia that deal with whether the holder of mineral rights is permitted to
perform certain activities that were not contemplated by the parties when the
instrument which granted the rights was executed. Part B explores this same
issue as it arose in cases in Virginia and Pennsylvania.
West Virginia Case Law

A.

Based on the critical nature of the natural gas industry in the state, and
because no clear answer exists to this important question, it seems inevitable
that this issue will be addressed by the Court. When the Court decides whether
gas producers can drill horizontally under the rights bestowed by older leases, it
will likely do so using the rules set forth by the following four cases.
1.

West Virginia-PittsburghCoal Co. v. Strong

The West Virginia-PittsburghCoal Co. v. Strong 6 case is one of the
earliest instances where the Court examined a mineral producer's ability to
employ a new mineral extraction technique through rights given in an
instrument executed prior to the invention of the technique. In Strong, the Court
determined whether mineral owners could strip mine a tract of land under rights
given by a deed executed before strip mining became a "common practice."
The ownership rights to the coal underneath a 127.74 acre tract were severed in
a deed executed in 1904.8 In addition to this conveyance, the grantee was also
given "the right and obligation to purchase the surface lying above the
Pittsburgh No. 8 vein which the owner of the coal might occupy or use for its
operations." 59 The severance deed specified the rights given to the grantee:
Together with the right to enter upon and under said land with
employees, animals and machinery at convenient point and
points, and to mine, dig, excavate and remove all said coal, and
to remove and convey from, upon, under and through, said
land all said coal and the coal from other land and lands and to
make and maintain on said land all necessary and convenient
structures, roads, ways, and tramways, railroads, switches,
excavations, air-shafts, drains and openings, for such mining,

56

42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).

5
5

Id. at 49.
Id. at 48.

59

Id
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removal and conveying of all coal aforesaid, with the exclusive
use of all such rights of way and privileges aforesaid, including
right to deposit mine refuse on said land and waiving all claims
for injury or damage done by such mining and removal of coal
aforesaid and use of such privileges.60
The dispute arose when the defendants attempted to stop the plaintiffs
from strip mining portions of this land. At the trial court level, the plaintiff coal
company contended that "the mining rights expressly granted in the deed"
permitted the holder of the right to "strip mine any part of the coal granted."61
Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that it had the right to purchase 22.6 acres of
the area above the Pittsburgh No. 8 vein for the sum of $226.00 and to strip
mine the coal under that land as well.
On appeal, the Court examined the severance instrument in its entirety
and found that in issuing the instrument, the parties intended to preserve "the
surface of the entire tract, subject to the use of the owner of the coal 'at
convenient point or points' in order 'to mine, dig, excavate and remove all of
said coal' by the usual method at the time known and accepted as common
practice in Brooke County." 62 The Court did not believe that strip mining was a
method accepted as "common practice" at the time the instrument was
executed.6 3
The Court concluded that the rights for removal of the minerals were
"such rights as are incident to the production of minerals by means of mines,
that is by shafting or tunneling."64 Because strip mining was not recognized by
statute in West Virginia until 1939, strip mining could not have been within the
"implied contemplation of the parties" for a severance deed executed in 1904.65
The Court made the "contemplation of the parties" requirement the standard,
holding that "[i]n order for a usage or custom to affect the meaning of a
contract in writing because within the contemplation of the parties thereto, it
must be shown that the usage or custom was one generally followed at the time
and place of the contract's execution., 6 6
This "contemplation of the parties" requirement has an obvious
connection to horizontal drilling. In Strong, the mining company wished to use
the new technique of strip mining, a mining practice that had not been
conceived at the time the instrument granting the mining rights was executed.
The Court did not allow strip mining to take place because the parties to the
60
61
62

Id.
Id. at 49.
Id

63

Id

6

Id.
Id

65
66

Syl. pt. 1, W. Va.-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 42 S.E.2d 46.
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severance deed could not have contemplated the technique or the burdens
imposed by it at the time of the deed's execution. If the Court today were to
apply this principle, and nothing more, to the question of whether horizontal
drilling should be permitted under leases executed before the technique became
commonplace, it would have no choice but to ban horizontal drilling under
these circumstances. The Court revisited the issue in 1980 in another coal
mining case.
2.

Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin

The Court addressed the contemplation of the parties issue once again
in Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin.6 7 The Martin family owned the surface rights
to a tract of land and wished to prevent the Buffalo Mining Company
("Buffalo") from constructing an electric transmission line on the surface.68
Buffalo had acquired the rights to mine a large tract of coal-part of which was
located under the Martins' property-as successors in interest to a severance
deed originally executed in 1890.69 The Martins' primary argument was that the
1890 deed was "silent as to the right of the mineral grantees ... to erect an
electric power line, and that, from a technological standpoint, such use would
not have been contemplated by the parties to the severance deed."70
The Martin case seems to deviate from the earlier Strong decision in
that it brings a reasonableness requirement into the court's analysis. Initially,
the Court noted that the 1890 deed language was "rather comprehensive"
regarding surface use and included "the right to 'telephone and telegraph
lines.' 7 The Court then stated the generally recognized principle that in
situations where the minerals have been severed and the grantee is given rights
to use the surface, "such surface use must be for purposes reasonably necessary
to the extraction of the minerals." 72

67
68
69

267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
Id at 722.

Id.

Id. at 723. Under other circumstances, the Martin case could have been much more useful
in answering the primary questions of this Note. In addition to the contemplation of the parties
contention, the Martins also set forth two other arguments. First, the Martins claimed that the
transmission line was being built to support a mine ventilation shaft that did not lie below the
Martins' land, and as such, the power line easement was not for "any mining purpose within their
tract, and consequently not encompassed in the severance of the 1890 deed." Id at 722. Second,
the Martins also contended that the power line constituted "an unreasonable use of the surface."
Id. Unfortunately, the court declined to address these contentions, simply because the Martins
had not raised these factual issues at the trial court. Id at 723.
71
Id.
70

72

Id.
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The Martins relied on three past cases7-most notably the Strong
case-in which the Court had refused to allow strip or auger mining in its
interpretation of the surface right language in severance deeds.74 The Court said
that the decisions in those prior cases were based on two grounds: first, neither
mining technique had been developed at the time of the severance deed and
could not have been "within the contemplation of the parties"; second, and
more importantly, both of those mining methods "virtually destroyed the
surface for its normal use." 7s The Court did not believe these cases were
controlling because a dispute over a transmission line "involves no claim of any
widespread destruction of the surface, but whether the utilization of the surface
for an electric power line can be inferred as a reasonable use within the context
of the severance deed language." 76
After conducting a search of legal precedent in other jurisdictions, the
Court was only able to locate a few past cases that directly addressed the
contemplation of the parties issue. In one instance, an Indiana appellate court
inferred a right to an electric power line easement in a 1905 deed that gave
broad surface mining easements but made no mention of electric power lines.
The Indiana court noted that coal mining machines were not operated by
electricity at the time the deed was granted, therefore there would have been no
need to include or exclude language involving electrically powered
machinery. The terms of that grant were "so broad and all inclusive" that it
was clear to the court that "the grantors intended to give the grantees any and
all rights reasonably necessary to the maintenance and operation of the said
mine and, indeed, they included therein everything which at that time was
known to be reasonably necessary."7 9
Based on its examination of the scant authority from other
jurisdictions, the Court stated that when the severance deed gives broad surface
use rights to the grantee in conjunction with underground mining, and when
these rights are combined with specific surfaces uses, "courts will be inclined
to imply compatible surface uses that are necessary to the underground mining
activity."80 In this instance, the Court noted that not only did the severance deed
grant several express surface rights, including the right to the use of telephone

7
Brown v. Crozer Coal & Land Co., 107 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1959); Oresta v. Romano
Bros., Inc. 73 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1952); W. Va.-Pitt. Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W.
Va. 1947).
74

Martin, 267 S.E.2d at 724.

75

Id

76

Id

"

Id. (citing Creasey v. Pyramid Coal Corp., 61 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. App. 1945)).
Creasey, 61 N.E.2d at 479-80.

78
79

Id

80

Martin, 267 S.E.2d at 725.
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and telegraph lines, the deed also "sets forth the general grant of 'all proper and
reasonable rights and privileges for ventilating and draining the mines and
wells.'" 8'
The Court went on to hold that when implied rights are sought, "the
test of what is reasonable and necessary becomes more exacting." 82 For a claim
of implied rights to be successful, the party must show "not only that the right
is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the mineral, but also that the right
can be exercised without any substantial burden to the surface." 83 Notably, the
Court made little to no mention of the actual contemplation of the parties
rationale in articulating its holding. In reconciling the Strong case with the
decision here, the Court believed that Strong was correctly decided "on the
more fundamental principle that a right to surface use will not be implied where
it is totally incompatible with the rights of the surface owner." Footnote 3 of
the case also sheds further light on the distinction:
In West Virginia-PittsburghCoal v. Strong ... we indicated that

from a technological standpoint the parties could not
contemplate strip and auger mining, and therefore the
technological advance would not be allowed. The fundamental
basis for all of the decisions is whether the easement sought was
substantially compatible with the surface rights granted to the
mineral owner and whether it substantially burdens the surface
owner's estate.84
Two of the five justices strongly dissented with the Martin majority,
arguing that the majority had essentially turned its back on the contemplation of
the parties rationale in favor of the Indiana rule.ss Specifically, the dissent
alleged that the holding
displaces the intention of the parties as a controlling factor, and
somehow finds that the West Virginia-PittsburghCoal decision

was based on some subliminal, perhaps primordial, unspoken
instinct of that court that it was balancing the burdens of the
rights sought by the mineral owner with the use of the surface by
the owner thereof.86

81

Id

82

Id
Id
Id at 724 n.3.

83

84
85
86

Id at 726.
Id. at 727 (Harshbarger, J., dissenting).
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The dissent appears to be correct in that the Martin decision creates
confusion for those attempting to predict how the court will determine the
rights of mineral producers. Martin suggests that when a party wishes to assert
an additional right under a severance instrument, i.e., constructing an electrical
line when the deed only explicitly allows telephone and telegraph lines, the
party must show that the right is "reasonably necessary for the extraction of the
mineral" and that it does not "substantially burden" the surface. This language
brings a reasonableness test to the forefront of the inquiry. At the same time,
however, the Court refused to discount any portion of Strong, which held that
the determining factor was the intentions of the parties at the time of the
severance and left practically no room for a reasonableness test.
3.

Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc.

In the same year that Martin was decided, the Court again took up the
question of whether a mineral producer could assert rights that may have not
been contemplated in the severance instrument. In Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals,
Inc.,87 the Court examined whether a past deed permitted a mineral rights
holder to transport men and materials across a surface property in order to
reach a strip mine located outside the property.88 The mineral severance
occurred in a 1902 deed, where the grantor reserved mineral and mining rights
through a reconveyance. 89 Specifically, the deed gave the grantor and his
successors "full rights of ways to, from and over said premises by the
construction and use of roads . . . or otherwise, for the purpose of ... shipping
or transporting all of said minerals . .. whether contained on said premises or
elsewhere." 90 Plaintiff William Lowe, who owned the nineteen acres at issue
here, was one of several heirs to the original grantee and property owner. 9 1
Defendant Guyan Eagle was a successor to the reserved mineral rights.92
At one point, the Amherst Coal Company held the mineral rights to
Lowe's land and mined for the minerals under the property. 93 Later, Guyan
Eagle acquired these mineral rights, and, separately, the right to strip mine the
adjacent Buffalo Creek watershed. 94 Although Guyan Eagle never mined for
the coal under the Lowe property, the company did use the old Amherst right-

87
88

273 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1980).
Id at 92.

89
90

Id at 92-93.

9'

92

Id at 92.
Id

9

Id

94

Id.
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of-way to haul materials and workers to and from the strip mine.95 The dispute
arose when Lowe sued Guyan Eagle for trespass and unauthorized use of his
property. 96
The Court distinguished this case from Martin97 by stating that no
implied easements or reservations were involved here. 98 Instead, the language
"expressly reserve[d] the right to use the surface for transporting coal from
other property," 99 and as such, the facts here were more similar to those found
in Strong.00 The Court stated that the Strong decision was "based on the
compatibility of a mineral owner's uses of and burdens of a surface owner's
estate, with the intention of the parties to the deed."101 These were questions of
material fact and prevented the Court from allowing summary judgment in this

case.102
In stating the rule of law, the Court held that right-of-ways were not to
be used in a manner that is "different from that established at the time of its
creation so as to burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was
contemplated at the time of the grant."' 03 The Court remanded the case to
determine whether the "technology of hauling" is so dissimilar from anything
generally considered in 1902 that the process creates an undue burden on the
surface property that was not contemplated at the time of the execution.' 0 4 If a
jury had found that hauling on the right-of-way was "within the contemplation
of the parties as to potential burdens on the surface estate," the defendant coal
company would have been entitled to continue the practice.'0o
This case rearticulates the holding in Strong and shows that the primary
difference between Strong and Martin is whether the rights being examined are
express or implied. The rights in question here-the right to use the surface to
transport coal from another property-were expressly reserved, therefore it
must be shown that transporting the coal does not impose more of a burden
than what was contemplated at the time of execution.
If the Court decides to adopt the ruling from Lowe in interpreting
horizontal drilling rights, the Court would be forced to embark on an
evidentiary analysis to determine whether horizontal drilling creates a burden

9

Id.

96

Id.

97

98

Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
Lowe, 273 S.E.2d at 93.

9

Id.

W. Va.-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947).
1o1 Lowe, 273 S.E.2d at 93.
100

102

Id.

103

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.

10
1os

Id
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on the surface owner's estate that was beyond anything contemplated by the
parties to the lease when it was executed. The analysis described in Lowe
appears to coincide with the reasonableness inquiry discussed in Martin.
Therefore, under this line of reasoning, if horizontal drilling creates such a
significant burden on the surface estate that the parties to the severance
instrument could not have foreseen the burden, horizontal drilling should not be
permitted unless the mineral owner obtains additional permission from the
surface owner.
The Court revisited the contemplation of the parties question more
recently in 2003. This case, discussed below, presents more confusion because
the ruling implies that the Court may be attempting to retreat from the
reasonableness inquiry of Martin and Lowe and revert to the more stringent
analysis described in Strong, which simply said that if the practice was not
contemplated at the time of the severance, it should not be permitted.
4.

Energy Development Corp. v. Moss

Energy Development Corp. v. Moss106 examines whether a mineral
producer is permitted to extract a mineral that was not considered valuable at
the time the mineral rights were granted. Moss involved a quarrel over the
mineral resource known as coalbed methane ("CBM"), which, as its name
implies, is methane that is found trapped within a coal seam. 0 7 Long viewed as
a dangerous byproduct of coal mining, in more recent years CBM has become a
viable energy source,108 thus leading to disputes over ownership. The particular
question addressed in Moss was whether a "standard oil and gas lease executed
in 1986" permitted the lessee to drill in the lessor's coal seams to retrieve
CBM. 09
In the 1980s, the Hall Mining Company, along with members of the
Moss family, owned two tracts of land in McDowell County and all of the
minerals under the surface, "including the coal, oil, and gas." 10 Representatives
from Energy Development Corporation, Inc. ("EDC") contacted Hall Mining
regarding a possible lease of the mineral rights, and two such leases for "all of
the oil and gas" were executed in September 1986."' The leases made no
explicit mention of CBM." 2

106

591 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 2003).

107

Id. at 137.

'08
'09

Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138.

n0

Id. at 138-39.

"'

Id. at 139.

112

id
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For the next twelve years, EDC drilled more than a half-dozen
conventional wells on the property but made no attempt to produce the CBM.113
A dispute over royalty payments arose in 1998, and during those proceedings
EDC petitioned the circuit court to declare that it had the right to drill into the
coal formations to produce CBM.114 This was the first instance in which either
party had argued over ownership of CBM." 5 While this action was pending,
Hall and the other surface owners, who were the appellees here, entered into a
separate agreement with another gas producer, GeoMet, Inc.1 6 This agreement
granted GeoMet, who apparently had some prior experience with CBM
development, the explicit right to develop CBM wells. 17
The trial court heard testimony from the parties in order to determine
"the knowledge or understanding the parties had with respect to [CBM] at the
time they entered into the leases." 1 8 The trial court stated that the lease
contained a latent ambiguity regarding CBM ownership and therefore, because
of this ambiguity, the court was entitled to consider extrinsic evidence,
including common industry practices at the time of the lease's execution.119
The trial court went on to hold that a general lease for "all oil and gas"
executed before any commercial CBM drilling had begun in the state did "not
unambiguously grant the lessee the right to drill the lessor's coal seams to
produce [CBM]."l 2 0 Furthermore, the trial court explicitly held that an oil and
gas lease executed before commercial CBM drilling began in West Virginia
and before state law permitted drilling and "fracking" of coal seams to retrieve
CBM "does not give the oil and gas lessee the right to produce gas from coal
seams retained by the lessor, absent language specifically providing for or
clearly indicating the intention of the parties to allow for that right."l21
On appeal, EDC argued that the "all oil and gas" language from the
1986 leases granted it the right to develop CBM.12 2 The Court noted that
although CBM was technically methane, the resource was "intimately bound to
the coal," and as such the case could not be resolved by a simple declaration
that CBM is either coal or gas.' 23 To solve this dispute, the Court would have to

113

id

114

id

115

Id

116

id.
"~Id.

118

Id. at 140.

119

Id

120

Id. at 141.

121

Id

122

id
Id. at 143.

123
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determine whether a gas lease that predated commercial CBM production in the
state would permit the practice if the lease was silent on the topic.124
Once the Court concluded the leases were ambi ous, it set out to
determine the intent of the parties in making the lease.12 In addition to the
"custom and usage of the gas industry at the time of execution," the Court
noted two other issues that helped to persuade the trial court that the appellees
did not intend to convey rights to develop CBM:
First, if the leases included the right to develop [CBM], then
they would also carry an implied right for [EDC] to invade the
coal seams of the appellees and stimulate them in a fashion that
could make it more difficult or dangerous to later produce the
coal; second, that the production of [CBM] was not a common
practice in McDowell County at the time the leases were
executed. 126
The Court stated that the rule from Martin,127 that "the test of what is
reasonable and necessary becomes more exacting" when the party is seeking an
implied right to mine coal, was applicable even though gas rights were in
question. 12 The Court noted its unwillingness to construct ambiguous
agreements in a way that would create "a large and possibly never-considered
burden on one of the parties" and declared that "generally, a court will not find
an implied right to conduct a given activity (not mentioned in the lease) unless
that activity is clearly demonstrated to have been a common practice in the
area, at the time of the lease's execution." 2 9
This principle is in line with the holdings from Strong 3 0 and Lowe.'3 '
In affirming the lower court's decision to prevent EDC from producing CBM,
the Court held that "in the absence of specific language to the contrary or other
indicia of the parties' intent, an oil and gas lease does not give the oil and gas
lessee the right to drill into the lessor's coal seams to produce [CBM]."l 32 The
Court did, however, state that all that a conventional gas lessee would need to
do in order to gain access to the CBM would be to "obtain the express right to

124

id

125

Id. at 144.

126

id

127

Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
Moss, 591 S.E.2d at 145 (quoting Martin, 267 S.E.2d at 725).
Id

128
129

130
42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947). The Moss Court also cited Phillips v. Fox, 458 S.E.2d 327,
333 (W. Va. 1995), essentially reaffirming the Strong holding.
1'
273 S.E.2d 91 (W. Va. 1980).
132 Moss, 591 S.E.2d at 146.
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produce coalbed methane from the lessor, or other party deemed to have
ownership of the coalbed methane."l 33
Moss again provides observers with confusion because it appears as
though the Court may be moving back toward the more stringent
"contemplation of the parties" standard. If that is the case, any mineral
extraction technique that had not been contemplated by the parties at the time
of the lease would not be permissible. This would include horizontal drilling in
cases where the severance deed or mineral lease was executed before the
technique became commonplace. However, a closer reading of the language in
Moss indicates that the Court may not have been discounting the
reasonableness analysis in its entirety.
The Court noted that it based its decision only on the factual scenario
in that given case. 34 In its analysis, the Court cited testimony from the parties
that showed that as EDC drilled its conventional gas wells, it failed to perform
tests on the coal strata to evaluate the possibility for future CBM production.135
EDC sealed off these wells with concrete casing that prevented any future tests
from being performed.136 This evidence, along with the fact that EDC had not
attempted to produce any CBM in the sixteen years between the lease execution
and the date of trial,13 demonstrated that EDC had no intention of producing
CBM at the time the lease was executed. Also, the Court pointed out that
allowing EDC to produce CBM would have required allowing EDC to
penetrate the appellee's coal seams based on an implied right.13 8
Based on this analysis, it appears that Moss may not actually be
proposing that any mining practice that was not within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of the agreement should be forbidden. This leaves the
reasonableness test discussed in Martin and articulated in Lowe intact: whether
the new mining practice places so great a burden on the surface property that it
was not contemplated when the minerals were severed from the surface.
Therefore, if this legal precedent is applied to the practice of horizontal drilling,
the Court should determine whether horizontal drilling creates a burden on the
surface that is so great that it could not have been contemplated when the
severance instrument was executed. If the answer to that question is "no,"
horizontal drilling should be permitted under instruments that were executed
before the practice was invented.

133
134

Id. at 153.

'5
136

Id. at 140.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 146.

Id. at 146.
Id.
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Casesfrom OtherJurisdictions

B.

The Court may wish to examine legal precedent from foreign
jurisdictions before deciding whether leases that predate horizontal drilling
allow producers to engage in the practice. The highest courts in other states
have heard similar cases involving mineral extraction that incorporate the
contemplation of the parties argument.
A Pennsylvania case, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge,' is similar to Mossl4 0
in that it addressed the "contemplation of the parties" argument in the context
of CBM extraction. In Hoge, a dispute arose between the surface owners of a
tract of land and the owner of the coal, the United States Steel Corporation
("U.S. Steel"), who had obtained rights to the coal from a severance deed
executed in 1920.141 The severance deed language conveyed "[a]ll the coal of
the Pittsburgh or River Vein underlying all that certain tract of land."l 42 The
surface owner, however, "reserve[d] the right to drill and operate through said

coal for oil and gas without being held liable for any damages." 4 3 In the
1970s, the appellee (the "gas lessee") acquired these gas rights from the surface
owner.14 4 When the gas lessee began drilling wells to extract CBM, U.S. Steel
filed an action to stop the gas lessee from drilling through U.S. Steel's coal
seam.145 This was the first time the Pennsylvania court reviewed issues of CBM
ownership and development rights.14 6
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that as early as
1900, wells capable of producing CBM in paying quantities were drilled into
the same vein of coal; however, the court further stated that "commercial
exploitation. . . remained very limited and sporadic until recently." 4 7 After an
initial analysis of the properties of CBM, the court held that, generally
speaking, CBM belongs to the owner of the coal in which the gas lies.148 The
court found that the coal owner, as owner of the gas, "may allow others certain
rights respecting the gas." 49 The court examined the severance deed, which

139
140

"'
142

143

468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
See supra Part III.A.4.
Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1382-83.
Id. at 1382.

Id

'*
144

Id.

145

Id

146

id

147

Id. at 1383.

148

id
Id. at 1384.

149

id.
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reserved these rights for the grantor, to determine the intent of the parties while
considering "conditions existing at the time of its execution."150
The court found that "[a]lthough the unrestricted term 'gas' was used
in the reservation clause," the common practice at the time of the severance
deed was to vent CBM as a waste product.' 5 ' Under those circumstances, the
court found it "inconceivable that the parties intended a reservation of all types
of gas." 52 The court believed that the "gas" that was reserved by the deed
reservation was "the gas. .. which was generally known to be commercially
exploitable," namely natural gas. 53 In so holding, the court essentially found
that the parties to the severance deed had not contemplated the practice of
drilling for CBM because it was not common to the industry at the time of
execution.154 Therefore, the court would not extend the severance deed to
include rights to drill for CBM more than sixty years later. This principle can
certainly be carried over into the context of horizontal drilling, as discussed in
Moss.
The Virginia case of Phipps v. Leftwich's is akin to the Strong156
decision from West Virginia. In Phipps, the Supreme Court of Virginia
oversaw a dispute between surface owners and mineral owners over the right to
strip mine a property. The appellants, who acquired title to the minerals and
mineral rights from a 1902 deed,'57 argued that the language of the deed
conveyed the right to strip mine.' 58 Specifically, the appellants relied on "the
grantee's right under the deed to enter upon the land 'and use and operate the
same and the surface thereof free from further costs or damages in all or any
manner' deemed 'necessary or convenient."'"5 9 The court stated that deeds such
as this must be construed to find the intent of the parties at the time the deed
was executed.16 0
There was no dispute that when the deed was executed in 1902, strip
mining was not a common practice in that county and that the only kind of
mining within the "contemplation of the parties" at that time was underground

150

Id

151

Id

1s2

Id. at 1384-85.

153

id.
See id. at 1384-85.

154

"'

222 S.E.2d 536 (Va. 1976).
W. Va.-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1947); see also supra Part
III.A.1.
1
Phipps, 222 S.E.2d at 538.
156

"8

Id. at 539.

159

Id.

160

Id.
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mining. 16 Thus, the court found that "the broad language of the deed [was to
apply] only to underground mining."l 6 2 The court declined to extend the rights
granted in the deed to include strip mining, but did make this additional point:
Appellants may, of course, take advantage of developments in
the operation of underground mines which modem technology
may make available. Improvements in mining machinery,
power, lighting, ventilation, transportation, and safety facilities
may be utilized. A change, however, from underground
mining, which leaves the surface substantially usable by the
owner of the freehold, to surface mining, which destroys what
was reserved by the grantor, is not permissible.16 3
The Phipps decision goes a step further than the Strong holding in that
it explicitly states that mineral rights holders may employ technologies and
techniques that had not been invented at the time the instrument granting the
mineral rights was executed. However, the Phipps court still stands for the
proposition that if the new practice "destroys what was reserved by the
grantor," the mineral estate should not be extended to allow the new practice
absent express permission.' 64 In the context of horizontal drilling, the question
comes down to whether horizontal drilling, as opposed to vertical drilling,
destroys the surface and prevents the surface owner from enjoying his land.
C.

Summary: The Issue Remains Unclear

To date, the question of whether leases predating the common use of
horizontal drilling allow natural gas producers to drill horizontal wells has not
been litigated in front of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Lawyers
may be weary to dispute the issue with such uncertainty surrounding the
Court's position, given the state of the common law.
The West Virginia cases examined by this Note provide some help in
attempting to predict which way the Court will rule on the issue. If the Court
were to apply the holding from Moss alone, it would most likely find that
horizontal drilling should not be allowed under leases executed prior to the
common use of horizontal drilling because the practice was not within the
contemplation of the parties when the lease was executed. The Martin and
Lowe cases, however, appear to provide a reasonableness consideration that
would allow producers to use horizontal drilling as long as the drilling does not
burden or damage the land to an extent that was not foreseen at the time of
execution. Finally, the Moss decision creates even more confusion because it
161

Id at 540.

162

Id.

163

Id at 541.

14

id
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may stand for the proposition that the Court is returning to the strict
"contemplation of the parties" position first articulated in Strong.
The cases examined from outside West Virginia, while potentially
useful in providing some direction to the Court, also do little to provide a clear
answer. The Hoge case from Pennsylvania essentially holds that leases
executed prior to the common production of CBM will not allow producers to
use the lease to assert CBM rights in the future.16 5 The Phipps case from
Virginia holds that leases executed prior to the advent of strip mining will not
permit strip mining to occur when the lease only granted underground mining
rights.166 However, Phipps also states that mining companies may take
advantage of technologies that were not in existence at the time the lease was
executed. 167
None of these cases provide a rule that can be directly analogized to
horizontal drilling for natural gas. For example, while the Moss case holds that
strip mining is not permitted under leases that were executed before the
invention of this technique, 8 the practice of strip mining completely destroys
the surface of the land and prevents the surface owner from having virtually
any use of the land whatsoever. On the other hand, while horizontal drilling
may inflict more of a burden on the surface of the land than traditional vertical
drilling, it cannot be reasonably argued that horizontal drilling damages the
land to the same extent as strip mining.
Furthermore, the only West Virginia case examined by this Note to
discuss natural gas at all was Moss, and the natural gas discussed in that caseCBM-was tied inextricably to the coal underground.169 In short, any analogy
of the rules provided by these cases would involve analogizing rules developed
for the coal mining industry and interpreting them in the context of the natural
gas industry.
Unfortunately, these cases are the best legal precedent available for
trying to predict how the Court will answer the question of whether horizontal
drilling should be permitted under leases executed before the common use of
horizontal drilling. And, as described throughout this Note, the cases do not
provide enough clear answers for one to reliably predict how the Court will rule
on the issue. At this time, the state of the law is simply too uncertain to give a
strong opinion on which direction the Court will go.

See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Pa. 1983).
166 See Phipps v. Leftwich, 222 S.E.2d 536, 542 (Va. 1976).
165

167

See id at 541.

See supra Part III.A.4.
169 See supra Part HI.A.4.
168
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The Court Should Hold That HorizontalDrillingIs Permissible Under
Leases That Predatethe Common Use ofHorizontalDrilling

Although the law is too unclear to make a reliable prediction as to how
the Court will rule, the Court should follow the holding in Martin and the
language from the holding in Lowe and, in cases where the instrument granted
"a right to drill" for natural gas, conduct an evidentiary analysis to determine
whether horizontal drilling would create so great a burden on the surface owner
so as to not have been contemplated by the parties who executed the
instrument.
An analysis of this sort would consist of comparing the various burdens
placed on the surface owner caused by both horizontal drilling and vertical
drilling. Some of these burdens include, but are not limited to, the amount of
time and surface property that is required to drill and maintain the wells. 7 0
The practice of strip mining, which was discussed extensively in
Strong, can be looked to as an example. That technological advancement
completely destroyed the surface of the land and virtually destroyed the right to
surface enjoyment for the surface owner.171 When compared to vertical drilling,
horizontal drilling does not create as great of a burden on the surface as does
strip mining when compared to traditional shaft mining.
When cumulative surface use is taken into account, horizontal drilling
may actually reduce the burden on the land.172 Historically, a natural gas
producer would drill numerous wells on a given tract of land to reach most or
all of the available gas. Horizontal drilling, which allows a producer to reach
considerably more natural gas from a single well, can substantially reduce the
overall number of wells needed.173 Furthermore, this effect is compounded
when the producer is able to drill multiple horizontal wells from the same well
pad.17 4 While a horizontal well may take up more surface area than a single
vertical well, the horizontal well, with its ability to extract more natural gas,
can reduce the total number of wells needed and ultimately lower the burden on
the surface. 7 5
Although the financial costs associated with the construction and
operation of a horizontal well may be considerably higher,' 76 this burden is
borne by the producer, not the owner of the surface. Horizontal wells may also

171

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.A.1.

172

See supra Part II.C.

173

See supra Part II.C.

174

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
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require much more water to operate than vertical wells.177 However, this water
could be transported in from an off-site location and would not necessarily
create an additional burden on the land.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, it seems unreasonable to prevent
mineral producers from taking advantage of any technological advancement
that may come about in the industry. The Virginia court in Phipps held just that
when it stated that producers could "of course, take advantage of developments
in the operation of underground mines which modem technology may make
available."17 8 The Phipps court explicitly stated that mining companies could
take advantage of advancements "in mining machinery, power, lighting,
ventilation, transportation, and safety facilities."' 7 9 The Martin case seemed to
agree with this reasoning by allowing a mining company to build electrical
lines for ventilation purposes when the original deed allowed for the right to
build "telephone and telegraph lines." 80 It does not seem unreasonable to
extend this line of thinking to the case at hand and allow horizontal wells to be
drilled in situations where the instrument granted the mineral producer the right
to drill vertical wells.
The Court will need to balance the factors discussed above with some
of the burdens imposed on the surface by horizontal drilling through the course
of its evidentiary analysis. Horizontal wells take considerably longer to drill
than vertical wells.' 8 ' Also, the increased size and scope of the well usually
requires that more shipments of men and materials be made to and from the
well site.18 2 Even when these factors are taken into account, however, the
burdens on the land do not seem to outweigh the potential advantages of
horizontal drilling, most notably the fact that the cumulative surface used for
drilling can be greatly reduced by consolidating numerous wells into a single
location.' 83
Considering all of the factors involved with drilling and operating
horizontal wells as compared to vertical wells, one can reasonably conclude
that horizontal wells do not impose a burden on the land that is so great that it
was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution of the mineral
lease. Therefore, the Court should conclude that horizontal wells should be
permitted under leases that were executed prior to the common use of
horizontal drilling.

17
178
17
80
181

182
18

See supra Part II.C.
Phipps v. Leftwich, 222 S.E.2d 536, 541 (Va. 1976); see also discussion supra Part III.B.
Phipps, 222 S.E.2d at 541.
See supra Part III.A.2.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
See supraPart II.C.
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IV. CAN A MINERAL OWNER USE THE SURFACE ABOVE HIS TRACT TO DRILL
A HORIZONTAL WELL THAT CROSSES FROM THE FIRST MINERAL TRACT INTO
A NEIGHBORING MINERAL TRACT?

The Court has not yet answered the question of whether a mineral
owner may use the surface above a mineral tract to drill a horizontal well that
crosses into an adjoining mineral tract owned by the mineral holder. A dispute
on this issue could potentially arise if the owner of the surface on which the
mineral holder wishes to drill attempts to block the horizontal well from being
built.
For instance, a gas producer may wish to drill numerous horizontal
wells from the same well pad in order to drain a much larger area than could be
reached using a single, or even several, conventional vertical wells. As an
initial matter, the mineral owner would need to hold the rights to produce gas
from all mineral tracts that would be drained because a failure to hold this right
would clearly result in a subsurface trespass. However, the surface owner may
not approve of this production approach because the process for drilling and
maintaining the horizontal wells may create a substantially larger burden on the
surface than the process for drilling vertical wells. Regarding a mineral
producer's use of surface land in this way, the American Law Reports noted
that there would be an additional burden on the surface owner:
From the surface owner's viewpoint, . . . use of the facilities on

his land for mining any but the immediately subjacent minerals
places an additional onus on his already burdened estate, not
infrequently culminating in impeded exploitation of his own
minerals, diminished royalty income, postponed reversionary
interests, and actual physical damage to the land by reason of
the expanded operations.184
If all gas production takes place on the mineral tract that is subjacent to
the well pad, the surface owner may not have much say in the matter because
the horizontal wells drilled in the same location would likely be considered less
of a burden on the land than numerous vertical wells scattered about over a
larger area.'85 However, if the gas producer plans for one or more of these
horizontal wells to cross from the subjacent mineral tract into a neighboring
mineral tract, the surface owner may be able to rightfully object.

184 W.C. Crais Ill, Annotation, Right of Owner of Title to or Interest in Minerals Under One
Tract to Use Surface, or UndergroundPassages, in Connection with Mining Other Tract, 83
A.L.R.2d 665, 668 (1962).
185 See supra Part III.D.
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This section examines several sources to determine how the Court
should rule on this issue. Part A explores West Virginia case law to look at how
the Court has handled similar issues. Part B examines the law in other
jurisdictions pertaining to this question. Finally, Part C investigates treatise
authorities to understand how experts in the mineral resources field believe this
question should be answered.
The mineral owner should not be permitted to use the surface that lies
above his mineral tract to drill a horizontal well that crosses from the subjacent
mineral tract into a neighboring mineral tract. While a surface owner has no
choice but to allow a mineral owner to do what is necessary to reach the
minerals directly below his surface, the mineral owner should not be forced,
without his consent or any additional compensation, to allow the surface owner
to use his land in order to reach minerals that are not directly below his surface.
Considering the substantially increased cost, time, manpower, and surface area
required to drill a horizontal well, the surface owner should be able to prevent a
natural gas producer from using his land to drill a horizontal well that is meant
to retrieve gas at another location.
A.

Current State of West Virginia Law

Generally speaking, West Virginia case law appears to provide little
guidance on the question of whether a mineral owner can use the surface above
his tract to drill a horizontal well that begins in the subjacent tract and crosses
into a neighboring mineral tract. That being said, this Section examines two
cases that may help to shed some light on the issue.
In Fisher v. West Virginia Coal & Transport Co.,1 86 the plaintiffs filed
suit to stop the corporate defendant from using the surface of a tract of land and
to "restrain such defendant from transporting coal mined from adjacent tracts
through subterranean passageways in such tract of land."' 87 The plaintiffs were
owners of the tract of land but did not own the rights to the coal under the
surface.' 88 The defendant had acquired the leases for two tracts of land: a
sixteen acre tract and a one acre tract.' 89 The lease provided that the defendant
could
mine and remove the coal underlying the two tracts of land,
and other lands not involved in this suit, granted necessary
mining rights and privileges, with the right to transport coal

186
187

73 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 1952).
Id. at 634.

188

Id.
Id. at 636. The surface of the one acre tract had originally been conveyed to serve as a coal
yard for the grantee. Id. at 635.
189
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mined from adjacent tracts of land through openin s made in
the coal underlying the land described in the lease.
The parties both admitted that the defendant had been mining coal from
lands adjacent to the sixteen acre tract and that the coal from neighboring land
was being transported through the subterranean passageways beneath the
sixteen acre tract.1' Furthermore, both parties admitted that the installations
and structures that had been constructed on the one acre tract were being used
to process and transport this coal.192 The Court articulated two important
questions:
(1) Does the corporate defendant have the right to use the
surface of the [one] acre tract of land for the purpose of
transporting and processing coal mined from adjacent lands?
(2) Does the corporate defendant have the right to use the
subterranean passageways underlying the [sixteen] acre tract
for transportation of coal mined from adjoining lands?' 93
With regard to the second question, the Court held that as long as "the
coal under the 16 [sic] acre tract is neither exhausted nor abandoned, and
mining is being prosecuted with due diligence," the defendant, acting as lessee
from the owner of the coal "may use the subterranean passageways for the
transportation of coal mined from adjacent lands to an opening on lands owned
by its lessor."l 94 In the context of horizontal drilling, this holding could be
important for the practice of moving gas retrieved from adjacent mineral tracts
through the horizontal well passage. It seems that that this holding would allow
the natural gas producer to transport gas taken from adjacent mineral tracts
through the subjacent mineral tract, as long as the subjacent mineral tract itself
has not been "exhausted or abandoned." The holding, however, says nothing
concerning the way in which the mineral owner can use surface for this sort of
gas transport; it only mentions that the gas may be brought to an opening on the
lessor's lands.' 95
The first question, in which the Court discussed whether the defendant
could use the surface of the one acre tract for the purpose of transporting and
processing coal mined from adjacent lands, is more relevant to the question
posed by this Note. In addressing this issue, the Court held that "[i]n the
absence of a right arising out of contract, the corporate defendant has no right
to use the surface of the [one] acre tract of land for transporting and processing

190

Id. at 636.

191

Id
id
Id

192
1"
194

19

at 637.

at 637-38.
Id at 639.

Id
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coal admittedly mined from lands adjoining the [sixteen] acre tract."' 9 6 In this
case, the defendants did in fact have a right to use the land in this manner based
on a contract (a lease) between the defendant and the owner of the one acre
tract, who was not a plaintiff here. Therefore, the plaintiffs had no way to stop
the surface use on these grounds.
Although the Fisherdecision involved coal mining rights, the holdings
could be applied in the context of the natural gas industry. Considering the
additional burdens that horizontal wells may place on a surface tract when
compared to traditional vertical wells,' 9 7 it would not seem unreasonable for the
Court to extend the analysis in this way. If the rule established here were
interpreted in the context of horizontal drilling, the Fisher decision would hold
that a gas producer would have no right to use the surface to produce gas that
had been drilled for and retrieved on a mineral tract that lies outside of the
subjacent mineral tract.
The case of Cole v. Ross Coal Co.1 98 may also provide some guidance
to the Court. The controversy in Ross involved an action for declaratory
judgment in which the plaintiff requested the Court to determine the rights of
both the plaintiffs and defendants regarding a piece of real estate that was the
subject of a deed.199 Prior to the execution of the deed in question, the
defendant had owned all the coal underlying a 217.5 acre tract while the West
Virginia Coal & Coke Corporation ("WV Coal") owned the surface of the tract
and leased the coal from the defendant.20 0 In 1939, WV Coal operated the
Island Creek seam and removed the coal through a tipple on an eighteen-acre
section of the tract.20 ' In 1954, WV Coal stopped its operations on the tract and
conveyed to the plaintiffs "all the unmined coal in the Island Creek and
overlying seams" inside the 217.5 acre tract.202 This deed also conveyed "the
right to use the 18-acre tipple site ... for the purpose of mining coal from the
Island Creek and overlying seams in the 217[.5]-acre tract and any and all coal
from adjoining tracts."203 The defendant argued that the rights granted to the
plaintiffs by this deed were "inferior to the rights of the defendant with respect

Id. at 638.
See supra Part II.C.
'9
150 F. Supp. 808 (S.D. W. Va. 1957).
199
Id. at 809.
200
Id. at 810. West Virginia Coal & Coke Corp. was the predecessor in title to the plaintiff. Id
201
Id. This eighteen-acre location was the only portion of the surface on which a tipple and
other mining facilities could feasibly be built. Id.
196

19

202

id.

Id The Island Creek seam was one of several coal seams below the tract of land at issue
here. Id. The seams occurred at various depths, and Island Creek was one of the middle seams.
203

Id.
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to the 18-acre tipple site." 2 04 Furthermore, the defendant asserted that when
read as a whole, the deed expressed a "clear intent that defendant has the right
not only to mine the underlying seams of coal from under the 217[.5]-acre tract,
but also to bring coalfrom the same vein from other adjacent tracts and then
take it up through the surface."205
On appeal, the Court found that even though the defendant may have
had the implied right to use the surface above its coal in a manner that was
reasonably necessary to mine the coal, it did not necessarily have the right to
mine coal from adjoining tracts.206 It was true that "[d]efendant ha[d] an
implied right, by reason of necessity, to mine its own coal under a given
tract. . . ." However, the Court found that "with respect to coal from other
tracts, there is no such necessity, and therefore no implied right." 2 07 The Court
noted that it was true that the 1939 deed gave the defendant "the right to
transport, free of toll or wheelage, coal from other tracts through the underlying
seams of the 217[.5]-acre tract." 20 8 But that grant did not involve rights to
surface use and therefore could not be read to "extend defendant's right to use
the surface." 2 09 The Court also held that there was no merit to the defendant's
argument that the deed granted the defendant the right to use the surface for
coal mined from adjacent lands because the owner of a coal seam holds the
210
right to use the passageways to move coal mined from another location.
Ultimately, Ross appears to stand for the proposition that a mineral
producer may not use the surface directly above his mineral tract to produce
minerals that were taken from a tract that does not lie directly below this
surface. In the context of the natural gas industry, this holding could be
interpreted to read that a gas producer may not construct a horizontal well on
the surface if that well is to be used to extract natural gas from a tract that is not
subjacent to the surface.

204

id

205

Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
Id. at 817.

206
207
208
209
210

id.
id
id
id.
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Casesfrom Other Jurisdictions

B.

The Court may wish to examine case law from out-of-state
jurisdictions to determine whether a mineral owner can use the surface above
his tract to drill a horizontal well that crosses from the first mineral tract into a
neighboring mineral tract. The American Law Reports has proclaimed that "[i]t
may be stated as a rather strict general rule that in the absence of contractual
permission, the holder of the minerals underlying a tract of land will not be
permitted to use the surface thereof in aid of mining operations on adjacent,
adjoining, or other tracts of land." 2 11 Unfortunately, even outside of West
Virginia, there does not appear to be a wealth of authority that specifically
discusses horizontal drilling that begins on one mineral tract and ends on a
neighboring mineral tract.
In Russell v. Texas Co.,212 the plaintiff sought relief against the
defendant, the Texas Company, for use of the surface in question-known as
section twenty-three-"in connection with its operation on section [twentythree] and on adjacent lands."2 13 The Texas Company had conducted extensive
operations on section twenty-three beginning in 1952 in reliance on an oil and
gas lease.214 In addition to these operations, the defendant had also used the
surface "in connection with operations carried on by it on lands other than
section [twenty-three]." 2 15 The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the
"reasonable value of the use of the surface of section [twenty-three] including
the use of water, rock and roads thereon in connection with operations on
adjacent lands" before a revocable license was accepted by the Texas Company
in October 1952 that permitted such use of the land.216 Additionally, the
plaintiff also requested damages for obligations the Texas Company incurred
based on that revocable license, which said that the Texas Company was to pay
the plaintiff "$150.00 a day for the continued use of section [twenty-three] in
connection with its operations on adjacent lands, a use admittedly in excess of
the easement flowing from the mineral reservation in the original deed." 2 17
The plaintiffs offer of the license to the Texas Company stated clearly
and unambiguously that "continued use of section [twenty-three] in connection
with activities and operations on other lands would constitute an acceptance of
the offer of the license."2 18 Because the Texas Company continued to use

211
212

Crais,supra note 184, at 670.
238 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1956).

214

Id. at 638.
id

215

id.

216

Id. at 641.
id

213

217

218

Id. at 642.
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section twenty-three in this manner, the trial court found that its actions had
come within the acceptance terms.219 In stating the rule of law, the Ninth
Circuit held that there was "a well established principle of property law that the
right to use the surface of land as an incident of the ownership of mineral rights
in the land, does not carry with it the right to use the surface in aid of mining or
drillingoperations on other lands."220 The court found that this use of the land
was tortious, and, furthermore, the plaintiff offeror was reasonably able to
believe that the act of the defendant offeree was an acceptance based on the
facts of the case.22 1
In Moore v. Lackey Mining Co.,222 the Kentucky Court of Appeals took
on the issue of whether a mineral lease granted a leasee the express or implied
right to use the surface of the land in connection with coal being mined on
other tracts. The pertinent language of the lease ("Hays lease") granted "all the
necessary rights and privileges to the successful mining of this coal."22 3 In
addition to its mining operations on the tract covered by this lease, the appellee
also owned a coal lease on an adjoining tract of land, where it conducted
mining operations both above and below the surface. 224 At some point, the two
underground mines were merged, at which time the appellee ceased use of the
opening and tipple on the surface of the adjoining tract and began to bring all
the coal from both tracts to the surface using the land covered by the Hays
lease.225 Furthermore, all of the coal was to be loaded for market using the
structures located on the Hays lease.22 6 The appellants brought suit to stop this
practice, alleging that the lease did not give the appellee the right to use the
surface in such a way.227
In analyzing the rulings of the high courts of several other states,228 the
Moore court noted that numerous other cases established the doctrine that an
owner in fee or lessee of coal "has the right ... to use the underground
passages or gangways made by removing the coal from the chamber containing

219

Id

220

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 642-43.
284 S.W. 415 (Ky. 1926).
Id at 416 (emphasis added).

221

222
223

224
225
226
227

id
id
id
id

228
See Consol. Coal Co. v. Schmisseur, 25 N.E. 795 (Ill. 1920); Moore v. Indian Camp Coal
Co., 80 N.E. 6 (Ohio 1907); Wadsworth Coal Co. v. Silver Creek Mining Ry. Co., 40 Ohio St.
559 (Ohio 1884); Westerman v. Pa. Salt Mfg. Co., 103 A. 539 (Pa. 1918); N.Y. & Pittston Coal
Co. v. Hillside Coal & Iron Co., 74 A. 26 (Pa. 1909); Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A.
1035 (Pa. 1891); Claybom v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 105 S.E. 117 (Va. 1920).
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it for transporting coal from other lands owned by or under lease to him."22 9
The court made it very clear, however, that those cases dealt exclusively with
the rights to use underground passages. 230 The Moore court pointed out that
[N]one of [those holdings], save in cases where the lease or the
instrument granting the fee in the coal authorized it, established
the principle that the coal from adjacent lands might be brought
to the surface through the pits, shafts, or entries from the
surface of a given lease and its surface be used as the dumping
ground of the refuse therefrom, and the structures on its surface
be used in mining or loading or marketing such coal.23 1
The court held that the right for an owner or lessee of coal underlying a
tract to "use the pits or shafts or openings to the surface and the surface in
cleaning, screening, loading, and marketing coal from adjacent lands ... must
be contracted for and granted by the deed, lease, or reservation." 232
Furthermore, the express language of the lease which referred to "this coal"
made it clear that the lease gave the appellee only the right to use the surface
for mining activities related to the coal directly beneath the surface.233
While the majority of cases on this subject appear to involve coal
mining, another Ninth Circuit opinion deals with the oil and gas industry. In
Franz Corp. v. Fifer,2 34 the plaintiff Fifer sought to recover for damages on his
ranch property caused by the corporate defendant.235 The plaintiff had leased
the property to the defendant 'for the sole and only purpose of mining and
operating for oil and gas, the laying of pipe lines and building of tanks, power
stations, and structures thereon, to produce, save, and take care of said
products.", 23 6 Additionally, the lease held the lessee responsible for any
damages to the property, including damages done to the plaintiffs crops or
fences.23 7
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, among other things, "built
tanks and pumping stations for the purpose of caring for and handling
production of oil produced upon lands other than those belonging to plaintiff,
and built a pumping station upon the lands of plaintiff, to supply water for its

229

Moore, 284 S.W. at 417.

230

id.
Id.

231
232
233

id.
Id. at 418.

234

295 F. 106 (9th Cir. 1924).
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Id. at 106.
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own operations in another field." 238 Furthermore, the plaintiff asserted that the
defendant had "carried on extensive oil operations on lands adjacent to and in
the vicinity of the lands belonging to plaintiff, and made use of the right of
entry upon plaintiffs lands in carrying on such operations." 2 3 9 These actions by
the defendant allegedly caused the plaintiffs fences and crops on the property
to be damaged.240
The lower court held that the defendant would not be responsible for
damages to the ranch property, including the erection of buildings, pumps, and
pipe lines, which were "reasonably necessary for the purposes of taking oil out
of the leased land." 24 1 However, the trial court also instructed the jury that the
"defendant would not be justified in making the land leased the basis of
operations on surrounding lands that the defendant was engaged in taking oil
from." 24 2 Furthermore, if the defendant did in fact use the land in such a way,
"and by reason of that fact did greater injury than was the natural consequence
of operations upon the leased land, then for such excess injury defendant would
be liable to the plaintiff." 24 3 In affirming the damages award for the plaintiff,
the court held that it was correct to allow the jury to determine whether the
Fifer lands were being used as a base of operations for mining on other fields
not belonging to Fifer, and that the evidence tended to coincide with the jury's

findings. 24 4
The foregoing cases all stand for the proposition that a mineral owner
may only use the surface above his mineral tract to extract minerals that lie
within the subjacent mineral tract. If the owner wishes to use the surface to
extract minerals from adjacent lands, the mineral owner needs to obtain express
permission from the owner of the surface land. Therefore, the rules established
by these cases, if applied to horizontal drilling, would lead to the conclusion
that a natural gas producer cannot drill a horizontal well that crosses from the
subjacent mineral tract into an adjoining mineral tract without express
permission from the owner of the surface on which the well is to be drilled.
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TreatiseAuthority

An examination of relevant treatises on oil and gas law could be of
some benefit for the Court in deciding whether a gas producer may drill a
horizontal well from one mineral tract into a neighboring mineral tract. In Oil
and Gas Law, one of the most thorough general treatises in the field of mineral
rights, the scholars take up the question of whether the surface of a tract of land
may be used in connection with operations on other premises.24 5 Section 218.4
of the treatise states the following:
The usual express easements and implied surface easements of
a mineral owner or lessee are limited to such surface user (sic)
as is reasonably necessary for exploration, development and
production on the premises described in the deed or lease. Of
course the instrument may expressly grant easements in
connection with operations on other premises; such an express
provision is common in joint or community leases or
instruments which authorize pooling and unitization. Absent
such express provision, clearly the use of the surface by a
mineral owner or lessee in connection with operations on other
premises constitutes an excessive use of his surface
easements.2 46
The language above illustrates that the authors take the position that
when a mineral holder does not have the express permission to use the surface
for mining operations on adjacent lands, using the surface in such a way is
wrongful. The treatise goes on to discuss the issue in terms of directional well
drilling:
Directional drilling techniques have so far advanced since the
second quarter of the century that by whipstocking wells and
directional surveying it is often possible to bottom wells at
predetermined locations. When for one reason or another, the
surface of a given tract (Blackacre) may not be utilized for a
well location, e.g., because the surface is a public way or
railroad right of way or the mineral deed or lease severing
exploration and development rights expressly denies the
mineral owner or lessee any surface easements, frequently it is
possible to locate a well on other nearby premises (Whiteacre)
and by directional drilling bottom the well under Blackacre.
Under these circumstances may the owner of the surface rights
in Whiteacre bar the use of the surface for a well location even
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though the owner of mineral rights in Whiteacre has authorized
such well location or himself seeks to make such well location
for the purpose of recovering minerals from adjoining premises
on which he holds a mineral lease or mineral interest? The
consensus is that such veto power exists, although there is little
case authority on the matter. The reason for the dearth of such
authority is that such veto power appears generally assumed
and hence operators who desire to engage in such activities
have sought to obtain from the surface owners an express
easement for such a well location.247
The opinion from this treatise could easily be directed toward
horizontal wells in addition to the directional wells discussed because both
types of wells are capable of being started on the surface of one tract and
ending underneath the surface of another tract. The treatise author opined that
the surface owner does have veto power to prevent this use of his land.248
Furthermore, the author believed that the reason for the lack of authority on the
issue is because typically, if a gas driller wishes to use the surface in such a
way, it will seek express permission from the surface owner in doing so.249
Other treatises concur with the opinion from Oil and Gas Law. Dean
Kuntz also commented on the rights of the mineral owner:
If the title to all minerals has been severed, the mineral owner
is entitled to the use of the surface for the purpose of extracting
minerals from such land. His right to use the surface for such
purpose is necessarily exclusive. Such mineral owner should
not have the right to use the surface for the other purposes,
such as the purpose of removing minerals from another tract of
land.250
The treatises discussed in this section clearly support the notion that a
mineral owner who attempts to use the surface above his mineral tract in order
to extract minerals from mineral tracts that do not lie directly under the land is
exceeding his rights. When applied to horizontal drilling, these treatises would
support the argument that in order for a natural gas producer to drill a
horizontal well that crosses from the subjacent mineral tract into an adjoining
mineral tract, the producer needs to obtain express permission from the surface
owner.
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Summary

The authorities examined by this Note all point to the same conclusion:
mineral owners should not be permitted to use the surface above their mineral
tract to facilitate extracting minerals from a tract that is not directly below the
surface. The mineral owner does, by necessity, have the right to use the surface
directly above his minerals to extract those minerals; however, this right should
not be extended when the mineral owner attempts to use the surface in the
course of extracting minerals elsewhere. The case law in West Virginia, the
cases cited from out-of-state jurisdictions, and the learned treatises discussed
above all appear to agree on this rule.
Although most authorities on the topic discuss this rule in terms of the
coal mining industry, this principle can and should be carried over to the
natural gas industry and the practice of horizontal drilling. Accordingly, it
seems clear that a natural gas producer who wishes to drill a horizontal well
that begins on one mineral tract and ends on an adjoining mineral tract should
be required to obtain permission from the surface owner before drilling.
V. CONCLUSION

With the recent boom in natural gas drilling in West Virginia and the
surrounding region, it is crucial that the Court provide both gas producers and
property owners with concrete answers regarding the legality of horizontal
drilling. The development of the Marcellus Shale has made the need for clear
rules on horizontal drilling all the more important because the technique has
become vital to extracting gas from the unforgiving rock formation in a costeffective manner.
This Note has explored two important legal questions. First, the Note
examined whether mineral leases which predate the common practice of
horizontal drilling allow a lease holder to drill a horizontal well. Early West
Virginia case law related to the question has held that a mineral extraction
technique that was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the execution
of a mineral lease should not be permitted. However, later West Virginia cases
have appeared to stand for the proposition that as long as a new mineral
extraction technique does not create a burden on the surface of the property so
extensive that it could not have been contemplated when the lease was
executed, the technique should be permitted. After considering the burdens
imposed by horizontal drilling techniques when compared to traditional vertical
drilling, the Court should allow horizontal drilling to take place because it does
not create an unreasonable burden on the surface.
Second, this Note examined whether a mineral owner should be able to
use the surface above his mineral tract to drill a horizontal well that crosses
from the subjacent mineral tract into a neighboring mineral tract. While West
Virginia case law does not provide an entirely clear answer to this question,
several cases on coal mining appear to hold that a mineral producer should not

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 115, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 18

530

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115

be permitted to use the surface above one mineral tract to extract minerals from
a neighboring mineral tract. Furthermore, cases from other jurisdictions and
relevant treatises on the topic support this position even more clearly.
Therefore, a mineral producer who wishes to drill a horizontal well that begins
in a subjacent mineral tract and proceeds into a neighboring mineral tract
should be required to obtain permission from the surface owner before
proceeding.
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